

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SIXTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 29 April 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

(India)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. S.F. RAE

Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA

Mr. V. PECHOTA

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU

Ato M. CHEBEYEMU

India:

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. S.B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI

Mr. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU

Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Mr. O. NEDA

Mr. S. SERBANESCU

Sweden:

Baron C.H. von PLATEN

Mr. S. LÖFGREN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. A.A. ROSHCIN

Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

Mr. I.M. PALENYKH

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. S. AHMED

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. S.F. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON
Mr. J.G. TAHOURLIN
Mr. D.N. BRINSON
Mr. R.C. BEETHAM

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLER
Mr. A.L. RICHARDS
Mr. D.E. MARK
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Secretariat:

Mr. H. CORNIL

The CHAIRMAN (India): I declare open the one hundred and twenty-sixth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. MBU (Nigeria): Mr. de Melo Franco, who as Chairman for the day opened this phase of our work on 17 April, said in his capacity as representative of Brazil:

"The first phase of our work in 1963, which was completed before the Easter holidays, was unfortunately not calculated to raise the hopes of the world regarding the progress of our disarmament negotiations." (ENDC/PV.121, p.5)

He went on to say:

"The real truth is that the positions of the two blocs have hardened. political divisions have deepened, and speeches on both sides — despite the speakers' skill — have merely bogged us down further in questions of prestige, with no attempt to treat the problems before us in a truly scientific and diplomatic way.

"As things stand today, the Brazilian delegation can see in this Conference no genuine promise of an early prospect of real negotiations or of putting new life into our work in a constructive sense. The Brazilian delegation even wonders if the decision to resume our meetings in such an atmosphere of impotence and confusion was really a wise one.

"My delegation nevertheless considers the resumption of our proceedings to mean that most other delegations have come to the conclusion that some immediate progress may still be anticipated. We respect and are gratified at their sentiments; but at the same time we think that the negotiations resumed today must be treated in a new spirit by the parties." (ibid.)

I have quoted that part of Mr. de Melo Franco's statement in extenso only because there is consensus ad idem in the view of my delegation with that Brazilian submission. The only progress registered so far since the inception of the Disarmament Conference is the acceptance by the United States of America and the Soviet Union of the Statement of Principles for the conduct of disarmament negotiations (ENDC/5).

(Mr. Mbu, Nigeria)

Two forces seem to militate against our reaching agreement on any issue of general and complete disarmament: first, the natural suspicion and conservatism of the States members of our Committee towards one another; and second, vested interest in armaments. Must we resign ourselves to running the incalculable hazards of a continuing arms race? We must resist that temptation. If we still cherish our freedom, we must protect it by ensuring that it co-exists with peace. One of the best ways of ensuring our freedom with peace is by reaching an early agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

The thick clouds of suspicion between the two sides continue to impede our progress on a test ban treaty. In the quest for a solution of our problem we must concentrate our efforts not only on appealing to those round this table to accommodate themselves, but also on persuading persons with the power of decision outside this Conference to come to the aid of President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev. As His Holiness Pope John XXIII said in his encyclical Pacem in Terris, one must never confuse error with the person who errs. It may be that both President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev are erring over the test ban issue. If that is true, there is compelling reason, in the interest of humanity, why non-aligned or non-nuclear Powers must intervene. Efforts by the non-nuclear Powers to take the initiative in this Conference may be dubbed sheer impudence, but if it is the only means of ending the stalemate, then the non-nuclear Powers' efforts must be encouraged. Our efforts may be described as incapable of producing results because, in the words of a Latin tag, nemo dat quod non habet -- he who has not got cannot give. We feel that we can play a substantial part in this Conference, especially when it becomes apparent, as it now appears to be, that the nuclear Powers are bereft of new ideas for the solution of our problem.

President Kennedy was quoted by our Soviet colleague on 22 April as saying that:

"... by 1970, unless we are successful, there may be ten nuclear Powers instead of four, and by 1975, fifteen or twenty." (ENDC/PV.123, p.25)

President Kennedy said further:

"... I see the possibility in the 1970's of the President of the United States having to face a world in which fifteen or twenty or twenty-five nations may have these weapons. I regard that as the greatest possible danger and hazard." (ibid.)

(Mr. Mbu, Nigeria)

Humanity cannot afford such an eventuality. My delegation therefore welcomes the Anglo-American initiative in the current talks in Moscow aimed at breaking the deadlock on a test ban. We hope the talks in Moscow will not be another exercise in futility. This conference has long been starved of reaching agreement on any issue. A test ban is long overdue. We refuse to be pessimists, and we believe that the wisdom of the statesmen of both the East and the West is capable of finding an honourable solution and common denominator for a nuclear test ban.

The nuclear Powers do not need to enlarge their fantastic nuclear arsenals or to improve further their nuclear capabilities and techniques; for we have been told all too often by both sides that they now have more than enough for mutual annihilation. Thus our Romanian colleague quoted on 10 April from Mr. Seymour Melman's Congressional deposition as follows:

"Let us call this relationship a 'Hiroshima equivalent' and let us use this in some military calculations that are at once nightmarish and realistic. On the entire surface of the earth there are now about 2,000 cities of over 100,000 population, containing about 600 million people. If every one of these cities were a target for nuclear destruction and if there were an allowance of 30 % of failure to deliver to target, then the U.S. strategic vehicles alone could deliver the equivalent of $2\frac{1}{2}$ million tons of TNT for each 100,000 people. Since it took only 20,000 tons to kill 100,000 people at Hiroshima, the United States now possesses an overkill capability on this global scale of 125 times". (ENDC/PV.120, p.10)

Possibly in order to give us the full picture, our Soviet colleague quoted at the same meeting a statement by Marshal Malinovsky commenting on an earlier statement by Mr. McNamara, the United States Secretary of Defense. He quoted Marshal Malinovsky as saying:

"I say categorically that we shall answer the 340 missiles, with which Mr. McNamara has been threatening us, with the simultaneous strike of a several times greater number of missiles and with such a power of nuclear charges as will completely sweep off the face of the earth all objects -- the industrial, administrative and political centres of the United States -- and will completely annihilate the countries which have made their territories available for United States military bases." (ibid., p.37)

(Mr. Mbu, Nigeria)

I dare say that the great nuclear Powers might derive mutual comfort from their capabilities for annihilation, but one wonders whether this thirst for destruction is insatiable.

Nine distinguished United States scientists, dispassionately analysing the event of a nuclear test ban, declared recently:

"The attackers" -- of a test ban -- "have failed to recognize the clear fact that once the overkill capabilities of the Soviet Union and the United States have reached their present level -- and hardened missile bases are in place, making a successful disarming attack impossible for either side -- an increase in nuclear capacity by one side or the other does not upset the balance of deterrence". (ENDC/25, pp. 1,2)

We have also been told that nowadays gains from tests are grossly and inversely disproportionate to the huge sums spent, that technically nuclear weapon tests have reached a point of diminishing returns. Today, world-wide exhilaration lies in a nuclear test ban and not in rigid adherence to old-fashioned clichés such as "States' status quo rests on bayonets". This is one issue on which we cannot afford to be intransigent. Let us therefore demonstrate to the world that no delegation here wants to entrap us into interminable desultory negotiations.

These considerations and the historic correspondence last winter between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy (ENDC/73,74) led my delegation to hope more than ever before that the nuclear Powers were at last seeing their way to reaching the long-awaited accord on a nuclear test ban. The position today does not admit the existence of an unbridgeable cleavage between the two sides. If only the two blocs can desist from political issues likely to exacerbate their differences -- because such issues are neither germane to nor compatible with our aim of attaining world peace through disarmament -- then the chances of a test ban agreement will be greatly enhanced. Not less important is the fact that the nuclear Powers have succeeded in strengthening the impression of their sincerity of purpose and will to agree on a test ban.

I should like to recall in this connexion what I said on 10 December 1962 (ENDC/PV.90, p.13) about the application of the Cuban formula to our negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty. I feel obliged to do so with particular reference to the speeches we have listened to and which we shall continue to listen to in this Committee. To re-state what I said on 15 February and 18 March 1963:

(Mr. Mbu, Nigeria)

"A stage has now been reached where mere declarations of intention are patently inadequate. We need a positive measure of success in our efforts."

(ENDC/PV.98, p.29);

and --

"However ingenious the nuclear Powers might be in the presentation of their own versions of the case, I must say candidly that what we want today is agreement on a test ban and not persuasive submissions. They may succeed in convincing the marines of the wisdom of their case; but let it be known that sailors will not believe them. The proof to us now that the nuclear Powers sincerely believe in ending all nuclear tests will be their compromising over their remaining differences. It is inconceivable that the controversy which has arisen over the numbers and modalities of on-site inspection might yet rob us of a test ban treaty during this current session. It is inconceivable, I say, because my delegation regards the remaining differences as infinitesimal."

(ENDC/PV.110, p.15)

My delegation still believes that the remaining differences are relatively small, although they are fast hardening into points of prestige. We continue to believe also that the risks, if any, of a nuclear test ban are smaller than the risks at present obtaining, and we see much value in Senator Humphrey's statement in the United States Senate that:

"As to the danger of secret undetected testing, it is the consensus of expert opinion that the risk -- while it is there -- is small, and that in any case it is extremely unlikely that the results of cheating could have an important effect on the military balance of power. The controlling consideration must be an objective weighing of the risks of a treaty against those of unrestricted testing. On the basis of available evidence, the balance is heavily in favour of a treaty, which, though not the panacea that over-zealous advocates might contend, can nevertheless make a solid contribution to the peace and security of our country." (ENDC/82, p.5)

My delegation also noted with considerable interest these words of Senator Humphrey on the same occasion:

"I have always said that disarmament or arms control is the other side of the coin of national defense. Without the capacity for self-defense, we could not long survive in the world of today. In the world of tomorrow we may find that the arms race itself has become the principal threat to our national existence."

(ibid., p.37)

(Mr. Mbu, Nigeria)

Representatives do not need to be reminded that the Nigerian delegation has never accepted the necessity for nuclear testing, or the reasons adduced to justify it. As I declared on 10 December 1962:

"It is the view of my delegation that it is not a search for national security that is preventing the nuclear Powers from reaching an agreement, for the leaders of the two sides have recognized that the present so-called security is precarious and that there can be no real security until we stop amassing, and perfecting by testing, and start eliminating deadly weapons of mass destruction." (ENDC/PV.90, p.12)

And, as Mr. Atta of the Nigerian delegation declared on 12 April 1962:

"Although science and scientists have been quoted lavishly by both sides, it is our view that the issue with which we are concerned is essentially political; the aid of science is merely required to give the arguments added faith."

(ENDC/PV.19, p.16)

On 10 December 1962 I said also:

"What is required on the part of the nuclear Powers is a slight, though in the circumstances supreme, political act of good will. I hope that they will not be found wanting in that regard. It is our hope that this Committee will successfully plead with the nuclear Powers to discover their real interest and that of humanity, which pleads for the cessation of all tests in all environments, as eloquently expressed in United Nations resolution 1762 A (XVII)."

(ENDC/PV.90, p.13)

It is cold comfort to my delegation that almost all we have said, as quoted above, has validity even today.

The question therefore is: When will the nuclear Powers spare humanity the dreadful nightmare of our planet in flames from an atomic holocaust? I repeat the question, "When?" Of course, like little babes we shall be told, "In time the whole question will be answered." I hope I may be excused if I sound a little pessimistic. Time, if not against us, may elude us. It is when the Conference comes to the full realization of that fact that we can truly claim to have embarked upon the noblest and boldest adventure of our time -- a search for a nuclear test ban treaty.

The CHAIRMAN (India): I now call upon the representative of Bulgaria, whom I am sure we are all happy to see back in our midst.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): We have reached a particularly important point in our discussion of the cessation of nuclear tests. The scientific data which have been presented on both sides prove that it is undeniably possible for countries to detect and identify nuclear tests in all types of environment by means of existing national systems; this is true in particular of underground tests, which have long been a subject of controversy among the great nuclear Powers. There is of course no need to provide evidence from Soviet sources to demonstrate this possibility, since the Soviet Union has long maintained that national systems are perfectly capable of detecting and identifying all seismic events and thus of revealing any underground nuclear tests.

The United States has also acknowledged that national systems for the detection and identification of seismic events constitute an adequate basis for strict compliance with a treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests. Despite the admission by United States leaders and scientists of the undeniable fact that national seismic stations would be perfectly capable of ensuring the control and verification of the observance of a nuclear test agreement, the United States delegation at this Conference still continues to raise objections and to oppose the conclusion of a treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests.

It was in an attempt to remove these objections from the path to agreement that, during recent discussions on the cessation of nuclear tests, a number of delegations quoted from the declaration by nine United States scientists concerning the cessation of nuclear tests, published in the Washington Post of 9 April 1963. It is clear from the verbatim record of our meeting of 22 April that the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, has tried to minimize the significance of this declaration and to attach to it a meaning other than its true one. Mr. Stelle quoted the following phrase of the declaration:

"We have additional assurances in the fact that the Soviet Union has agreed to three on-site inspections should suspicious indications of underground testing be discovered by the detection system of the United States and the United Kingdom, and is willing to permit a number of automatic seismic stations on Soviet territory." (ENDC/85, p.3)

and expressed the following opinion:

"I think it is clear from that quotation, and from the context, that these scientists still believe that inspections are an integral element of a test ban treaty." (ENDC/PV.123, p.15)

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

We do not of course wish to dispute what in their declaration the United States scientists regard on-site inspections as an integral element of a treaty on cessation of tests. No one here has disputed that. It should, however, be emphasized -- and this is the important point -- that they accept such inspections as an additional assurance; in other words, they are convinced that the assurances provided by national systems of detection and identification of seismic events are already perfectly adequate to ensure the observance and implementation of a test ban treaty. The two or three on-site inspections accepted by the Soviet Union represent for the United States scientists -- and they are endeavouring to win over United States public opinion to this view -- additional assurances and nothing more. We know what "additional" means: it is something which is not essential, something superfluous.

Anyone who reads the declaration by the United States scientists carefully cannot fail to realize that the purpose of those additional assurances is not to give the signatories a guarantee that the treaty will be observed, but to remove the objections artificially raised and the difficulties created by those circles in the United States which make such demands in their efforts to oppose a treaty on the cessation of tests.

The aim of the Soviet proposal of last December (ENDC/73, pp. 3, 5) was indeed to facilitate the task of those in the United States who favour the cessation of nuclear tests, to help them to overcome the existing difficulties in the way of inducing the leaders of that country to take a political decision on the final prohibition of all nuclear tests. The gesture of good will made by the Soviet Union in offering an additional measure over and above those strictly necessary and adequate for ensuring compliance with the treaty has not, however, been valued at its true worth by the United States Government. As a result of the strong pressure exerted by the military-industrial complex in the economic and political life of the United States, this proposal has been rejected.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

It has, however, been amply demonstrated throughout this Committee's discussion of cessation of nuclear tests that it would be perfectly possible, scientifically and practically, to conclude an agreement the observance of which would be fully guaranteed by national systems for the detection and identification of seismic events. What is in fact now needed to achieve such agreement is a political decision. To facilitate agreement the Soviet Government, as we have emphasized, has taken a decision of great political significance. It has offered the United States additional assurances --- which are indeed scientifically superfluous --- by accepting two or three on-site inspections.

The Western Powers, however, continue to insist that further concessions should be made by the Soviet Union. In demanding that the number of on-site inspections should be increased, they are now endeavouring to prove that it is necessary --- in their view, of course --- to reach a compromise on something which, according to the statements of United States scientists themselves, is essentially superfluous.

The Western delegations are now trying to persuade members of the Committee and the public at large that it is necessary to arrive at a compromise, at an intermediate figure between the number of inspections proposed by the Soviet Union and the much higher figure proposed by the United States delegation. They would like to persuade us to admit that only such a compromise could be considered honourable. It is very strange to hear the United States delegation ask for an increase in the number of inspections, apparently so as to facilitate the conclusion of a treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests and ensure its ratification by the United States Senate. If such a method were to be accepted in the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests, and still more on disarmament, it would not be surprising to see the United States and the other Western Powers putting forward ever-increasing demands under pressure from the United States military-industrial complex.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

There can be no doubt that such a "method" would not help the work of our Conference, but would on the contrary create insurmountable obstacles. If we are really seeking an "honourable compromise", we must consider not the unjustified demands of certain circles of the United States military-industrial complex, but the present-day scientific and technological realities.

As we know very well, the scientific facts prove that the number of on-site inspections could well be nil without any danger of clandestine violations of the treaty. Given these facts, there can be no question of a compromise between seven and three, since the number of on-site inspections has been shown to be pointless and irrelevant --- in other words, it should be fixed at nil. In these circumstances, would it not rather be preferable to seek an agreement and a compromise with scientific reality, basing ourselves on the suggestions concerning the size of armed forces during stage I of disarmament made by the representative of India, Mr. Lall, in his statement of 3 May 1962? As you will recall, Mr. Lall suggested in this statement that, as a compromise between the Soviet proposal of 1.7 million men and the United States proposal of 2.1 million men in the first stage, we might agree to the figure of 1.5 million men (ENDC/PV.30, p.17).

Although at the time Mr. Lall described this figure as a "peculiar kind of compromise" (ibid.), this proposal was inspired by the same considerations as those which prompt our own efforts to secure the speediest possible conclusion of a treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests. In the present case we should not be adopting an arbitrary figure, or a "peculiar kind of compromise", were we to agree, for instance, on the figure of one or two on-site inspections instead of two or three. Such a figure is fully justified by seismological progress. What would be "peculiar" or strange in the case of tests would be to move in the opposite direction, in a direction directly contrary to scientific evidence, by suggesting a figure higher than two or three inspections a year. Such a compromise should be all the easier to achieve since, in his statement of 22 April, the United States representative said:

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

"Unless certain of the broad issues were resolved, numbers of inspections would be merely abstract figures." (ENDC/PV.123, p.16)

A statement along the same lines appeared in an editorial entitled "Test Talks with Moscow", published in The New York Times of 27 April

"We" --- the United States, that is --- "have long maintained that the number of inspections is less important than the degree of their effectiveness."

If, therefore, the number of inspections is not important --- or, at least, not as important as the degree of their effectiveness --- then let us agree on this number, particularly as, according to present scientific evidence, on-site inspections are superfluous. Let us then get down to the question of the degree of effectiveness of these inspections, a question to which the United States representatives attach such importance.

As you will recall, the Soviet representative said in his statement on 25 March:

"If that is all the difficulty amounts to," --- the reference is to the effectiveness of on-site inspection --- "then it seems to us that on this point we should be able to find a possibility for progress in our negotiations." (ENDC/PV.113, p.21)

The Soviet representative went on:

"We are sure that confirmation of this point by Mr. Stelle" --- confirmation that the United States is ready to accept two or three on-site inspections a year --- "will open up before the Committee favourable prospects for progress and speedy agreement in our negotiations". (ibid.)

In our opinion, it is in this direction that we should seek a solution --- and an immediate solution --- to the question. It is the only way now open to agreement, if this is genuinely desired by the Western Powers.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria),

But in spite of the Western Powers' declarations and their efforts to persuade the world of their desire to achieve an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests, their recent activities in the spreading and proliferation of nuclear weapons are not encouraging. We are in fact confronted by a United States decision to station United States atomic submarines in the Mediterranean, a fact which creates a serious threat to peace in this area and does not affect the socialist countries alone. It is obvious that, if the submarines were to attack the socialist countries from their Mediterranean bases, any counter-attack would have repercussions not only on the NATO countries which have been induced to agree to the presence of these submarines in the Mediterranean, but also on the countries situated around the Mediterranean.

The presence of these submarines in fact also creates a threat to countries which are not involved in the war preparations which the NATO Powers are carrying out in the Mediterranean; it creates serious dangers for all the countries of North Africa and the Near East. These submarines, armed with Polaris missiles trained on socialist countries in South-East Europe and on the Soviet Union, are likewise a threat, and a very great threat, to world peace.

Furthermore, according to Mr. George Ball, the United States Under-Secretary of State, the plan to create a NATO multilateral force (I quote Le Monde of 18 April):

"... gives the non-nuclear Powers an opportunity to participate fully in the direction and control of a nuclear force".

It follows that the United States decision to create a multilateral nuclear force runs directly counter to the efforts being made within this Committee to bring about the cessation of nuclear tests. Indeed, the creation of such a force would give the non-nuclear NATO Powers the right not only to participate in this force but also, as West Germany is doing, to develop their own nuclear forces. As we know, this has been denied by representatives of the United States and other countries, but has been confirmed by Mr. Drew Middleton, the New York Times Paris correspondent, who wrote on 28 April:

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

(continued in English)

"Qualified French sources doubt that the United States plans for giving West Germany a share in the control of a European nuclear force will appease German ambitions in this field. On the contrary, responsible French sources believe this step will only whet the Germans' appetite for an independent nuclear force".

(continued in French)

We may be told that these are statements by a journalist, that they are not official statements and have been discounted in official statements by the United States delegation and United States leaders. They are, however, facts reported to us by journalists, and opinions emanating from qualified French sources.

These activities therefore run directly counter to the efforts which we are making here to bring about a cessation of nuclear tests. There is no need to remind you of the catastrophic effects which German militarism has had upon Europe and the whole world in the past. This militarism is at present being fostered by former Nazi generals in Western Germany. The creation of such a multilateral nuclear force would play straight into the hands of these German militarists and revanchists who are only looking for means of creating fresh threats to the peace of Europe and for an atmosphere in which they could make a further attempt to impose their territorial claims.

These facts --- and there are a host of others of the same type --- inevitably cause us to reflect on the true aims pursued by the Western Powers in the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests. They are flagrantly inconsistent with and in direct opposition to the efforts being made by the great majority of States, which desire the cessation of nuclear tests, an end to the arms race, and the implementation of general and complete disarmament.

In these circumstances it is only natural that the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests and on questions of general and complete disarmament should be deadlocked. It would be surprising if they were otherwise, now that the world is confronted daily with the baneful activities of the Western Powers, the members of NATO and other affiliated military alliances, and above all by the United States of America.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

In order to persuade members of the Conference that the Western delegations are really concerned to achieve an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests, declarations of goodwill alone are not enough. It is essential that activities which result in the proliferation of nuclear arms and in the extension of their presence in different parts of the world should cease. The genuine willingness of the Western Powers to achieve an agreement must also be demonstrated by deeds.

The Soviet proposals giving additional assurances to the Western Powers and made on the suggestion of the Western representatives have been before us for more than four months. We think it is high time that the Western Powers took these compromise proposals into account. This is the only way of extricating the Conference from the present impasse. As we have already said, it only remains for the West to take a political decision. It is this decision which we have long been awaiting. It might perhaps be advisable for the Western delegations and for the Western countries to take this decision forthwith, because, with the display and show of force which these countries are now making throughout the world, mankind has no certainty of what the morrow holds in store. We must act promptly; we must act now in order to reach an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests, an agreement which will open the way to general and complete disarmament. The whole world is now awaiting a decision by the Western Powers, and above all by the United States of America, to facilitate agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America) As the Committee is well aware, the United Kingdom and the United States have once again taken an initiative to break the deadlock in the negotiations for a nuclear test ban treaty. On Wednesday, 24 April, the United Kingdom and United States Ambassadors in Moscow presented to Chairman Khrushchev a message from Prime Minister Macmillan and President Kennedy on the subject of a nuclear test ban treaty. We are now earnestly awaiting a favourable reply from the Soviet Union to that initiative.

The initiative reaffirms the genuine interest of the Government and people of the United States in a nuclear test ban treaty. As recently as at his press

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

conference of 24 April 1963, the President of the United States has restated our active interest in achieving a workable test ban treaty as soon as possible.

On 11 March 1963 Secretary of State Rusk told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

"Since the summer of 1958 the United States Government has consistently adhered to the view that a safeguarded cessation of nuclear weapons testing would be in our national interest. Periodic policy reviews in the light of the shifting patterns of foreign policy, of changes in the negotiating situation, and of technical developments have always produced the same answer: that an effective test ban treaty is in our national interest".

What are the reasons for our believing that a test ban treaty would be an important and useful step for this Committee to take? Mr. Dean summed it up very cogently on 27 August 1962, when he said:

"Such an agreement will be an important first step in bringing the arms race under control. It will be the foundation for the establishment of the necessary confidence, which must be built upon in order to ensure that other more far-reaching disarmament measures will be concluded and faithfully carried out. Such a treaty can serve to restrict and inhibit other countries from producing their own nuclear weapons. Finally, it will prevent further increases in the radioactive fallout from nuclear tests." (ENDC/PV.75, p.5)

Today I should like to take a more careful look at each one of those important reasons why we believe the conclusion of a test ban treaty is imperative.

A number of delegations have referred in their statements over the past year and three months of our negotiations to the importance of a test ban treaty as a first step in disarmament. That is the first major advantage of a nuclear test ban treaty.

In retrospect, it is probably true that we might have found a simpler, less complicated first step to approach the problem of negotiating a disarmament agreement. Nevertheless, world interest in a nuclear test ban has been strong and important from the very first time it was proposed in April 1954 by Prime Minister Nehru. Since that time the test ban has become, in the minds of people in this Conference and around the world, the most important first step on the road to general and complete disarmament. Many reasons have been given for that.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

In the first place, a nuclear test ban would mark a slackening in the efforts to improve nuclear weapons, and so would be a marked turning point downward in the to build newer, improved nuclear arms. Once that step had been taken with satisfactory results, new opportunities for further steps to slow down and stop the arms race would be possible. On 11 March 1963 Secretary of State Rusk said in this connexion:

"I believe that this problem may be more ripe for solution than perhaps any other first step in the arms control and disarmament field. It is clear that unless at some point we are able to step off in a new direction, the upward spiral of the arms race will continue unabated. The prospects of such a future for both ourselves and the Soviet Union are not attractive".

Therefore it seems clear, not only that the nuclear test ban is intrinsically a useful measure because it will mark the first downturn in the upward spiral of the arms race, but also that, as a first step, it marks a convenient and useful beginning point on the road to disarmament. There are many other useful measures, particularly in the nuclear field, which could accompany it. In addition, when put into practice, such a measure will begin the process of building confidence between the two sides.

This confidence-building aspect of a nuclear test ban could affect both sides in several ways. For example, under an effective test ban treaty, with the operation of a control system over a period of several years, both sides will gain confidence that the other side is not conducting clandestine tests in any environment. Similarly, an effectively-operated control system will serve to increase the confidence of both sides that verification systems can operate with a minimum of interference in the national security interests of States. Indeed, States should gain confidence that verification systems will work in the interest of their own security. Both of these confidence-building factors are important reasons why a test ban should be concluded as soon as possible. In turn, the confidence-building aspects of a nuclear test ban also explain why it is a reasonable measure to be concluded as a first step in the disarmament process.

An additional aspect of the importance of a nuclear test ban is that the arrangements worked out on a nuclear test ban in terms of the obligations which each side agrees to accept will themselves become an important precedent for future measures to turn down the arms race. That factor, while it sheds some light on the

importance of a nuclear test ban as a first step, also may explain in some measure why it has been so difficult to reach agreement on a test ban. Now, however, we have narrowed the difference between the positions of both sides to such an extent that it is important for us to press our negotiations to success. Certain of the precedents, and particularly such important ones as the principle of on-site inspection, have apparently already been agreed upon. Those foundations should be built upon quickly to move us forward to this important first step in the field of disarmament.

On many occasions at our past meetings the Soviet representative has sought to deprecate the importance of the nuclear test ban treaty as a first step in the disarmament process. He has often contended that the nuclear test ban is not strictly a measure of disarmament. We have replied by stating that, even in the strictest sense, a nuclear test ban is a real measure of disarmament. In one respect it might be called a measure of anticipatory disarmament. That can be easily seen if we consider what might have been the situation today if we had been able to reach agreement on a nuclear test ban before the development of the hydrogen bomb. The world would be considerably different now if that had happened; I think we can all agree to that. There would, of course, have been no hydrogen weapons available to any State.

In addition, the nuclear test ban, while it will not destroy any existing weapons or other instruments of war, will make the creation of new weapons very difficult. In turn, over a period of time, the research and development aspects of national military establishments will be reduced to the level considered necessary to meet the contingency of possible treaty violation by another State. Under those circumstances it is difficult to imagine that all nuclear weapons development establishments will be kept at the same strength at which they are maintained during an intensive programme of nuclear testing. In that respect as well the nuclear test ban will be a measure of real disarmament, for in time it will have an important effect on the size and operations of nuclear testing and research establishments.

A second major area of importance of a nuclear test ban is its role in retarding, if not making prohibitive, the manufacture of nuclear weapons by additional States. The Soviet Union has from time to time made the point that the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional national States will not be solved by the signature of a nuclear test ban treaty. We have not contended that a test ban would halt completely the proliferation of nuclear weapons; we have made it clear that the test ban will be an important step towards halting proliferation -- particularly in the field of nuclear weapons development and manufacture.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

We know from experience that no State has so far developed a nuclear weapon without having carried out tests. While it is imaginable that States might develop weapons without testing, they could have no confidence in the effectiveness of whatever weapons they might develop and manufacture without a testing programme. More important, however, is the fact that the refinement process by which nuclear devices are made into deliverable weapons also requires a certain amount of testing. Therefore, the process of the proliferation of nuclear weapons to fourth, fifth and sixth countries through their development and manufacture in those countries is directly affected by a nuclear test ban treaty.

President Kennedy made clear his belief in the importance of this aspect of a nuclear test ban at his news conference of 22 March in a statement which has already been referred to by our Nigerian colleague (supra, p.6). I believe the President's statement merits quoting again. He said:

"Now, the reason why we are moving and working on this question, taking up a good deal of energy and effort, is because personally I am haunted by the feeling that by 1970, unless we are successful, there may be ten nuclear Powers instead of four, and by 1975 fifteen or twenty".

President Kennedy continued:

"... I see the possibility in the 1970s of the President of the United States having to face a world in which fifteen or twenty or twenty-five nations may have these weapons. I regard that as the greatest possible danger and hazard."

Secretary of State Rusk also discussed this problem before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 11 March 1963. He said:

"A test ban would not of itself solve the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It should be recognized that at least one present nuclear Power and one Power apparently bent on developing nuclear weapons might not be persuaded to subscribe to the test ban treaty from the outset. However, many potential nuclear Powers might at this stage be induced to accede to the treaty."

The inducement to accede to the treaty might be particularly strong if the major nuclear Powers could obtain broad participation among the present and potential nuclear Powers. With unlimited testing throughout the world, the incentives to other States to develop nuclear weapons are greatly increased. With a treaty and relatively

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

broad participation in a treaty, our ability to persuade other nations to join in the treaty ban should be substantially increased, thus tending to brake the proliferation of nuclear weapons to further States.

It is clear, of course, that a test ban will not halt the transfer of nuclear weapons to the control of additional individual States; but a nuclear test ban may facilitate agreement on additional measures. As Secretary Rusk also pointed out in his statement on March 11:

"Moreover, a nuclear test ban could lead to further steps which would deal more directly with the proliferation problem. I am referring here to the possibility of an agreement, on the one hand, by the nuclear Powers not to transfer control of weapons or to give assistance in weapons development to countries not already possessing them, and on the other, by the non-nuclear Powers not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons of their own. Another possibility would be an agreement to halt the further production of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons and to transfer agreed quantities of such materials to peaceful uses. What should be emphasized here is that, while a nuclear test ban by no means offers a total solution, it would be a necessary first step."

Finally, there is a third major advantage of a nuclear test ban in eliminating the radioactive fallout caused by nuclear weapon tests. The extent of the danger to ourselves and to our progeny from fallout has been the subject of a good deal of controversy. The question about the effects of fallout has not been completely answered. There is, however, general agreement among scientists that any increase in the general level of fallout is harmful in some degree. Moreover, the danger of radioactive fallout, whatever its biological effects may be, is an important concern to many people in my own country as well as throughout the world. Its elimination is, we believe, a worthy goal. That is why my country has shown concern over the elimination of fallout in its present programme of nuclear testing underground.

Against these advantages of a nuclear test ban, each of us has balanced the military and security risks of an effective halt to nuclear tests. As my delegation has pointed out before, the United States firmly believes that the advantages far outweigh the risks, provided there is real and reasonable assurance that all testing has in fact ceased. The United States delegation would like to reaffirm again that position of the United States Government. It is our hope that the Soviet Union also believes that, for the many reasons we have outlined this morning, a halt to nuclear testing is imperative.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

The problem of providing firm assurances that all testing has ceased remains to be conquered. We on our side have provided an effective plan for a swift attack on the problem of negotiating the effective assurances for a sound test ban treaty. We have made clear our hope that we shall soon have the assistance of the Soviet Union in that effort. The solution of the problem will not be easy. There is still much work to be done, but we have come so far together that it seems to my delegation inconceivable that our work should not be pressed to completion. It requires but a simple effort from the Soviet Government. We await that Soviet effort.

Let me close by reaffirming the United States Government's intention to work for an effective test ban treaty. Let me also express our hope that, in response to the recent approach by the United States and the United Kingdom in Moscow, the Soviet Union will join with us in that effort very shortly, so that real negotiations may begin and so that we can reach swiftly the agreement which we deeply believe we all desire.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The question of the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests has already got beyond the stage of our negotiations when it was necessary to find a mutually-acceptable compromise solution.

If one is to give a candid opinion of what is happening in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on the question of the prohibition of tests, it is that these are no longer real negotiations but a sheer waste of time. Practically the same thing is happening in our negotiations on disarmament problems and on collateral measures. The situation with regard to the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests is clear to everyone. Let us recall first of all that the seventeenth session of the General Assembly gave this matter special attention. It adopted a number of decisions (A/RES/1762 (XVII) ; ENDC/63) which included an urgent appeal to the nuclear Powers not to resume any nuclear weapon tests after 1 January 1963, and a recommendation to the nuclear Powers that they should reach agreement as soon as possible on the question of prohibiting nuclear tests, taking as a basis for their negotiations the proposals of the eight non-aligned nations (ENDC/28). Everyone knows that this memorandum proposed that, for the purposes of control over compliance with an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, the already-existing national networks of observation posts should be used. With regard to inspection, the non-aligned Powers' memorandum put forward a compromise proposal. The gist of

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

the proposed compromise was that the parties to the treaty could invite the international commission to visit their territories and/or the site of an event the nature of which was in doubt.

Thus the seventeenth session of the General Assembly approved and recommended to the nuclear Powers as a basis for negotiations and for agreement -- I repeat again -- the use of the already-existing national systems for control over nuclear explosions. As regards inspection, the compromise proposed by the non-aligned States and approved by the General Assembly was that inspections should be carried out only when there was an invitation from the State on whose territory a suspicious and significant event had taken place.

The Western Powers -- the United States and the United Kingdom -- which miss no opportunity in their propaganda to emphasize in every way their support for the United Nations and its initiatives, have in this regard shown their true attitude towards the United Nations. They have shown that they reject without hesitation the most important recommendations of the United Nations when these resolutions are not in keeping with the policy of an armaments race and military preparations which is being pursued by the Western Powers. Later, however, under the strong pressure of public opinion all over the world and the growing demands of the peoples, and also as a result of the progress of science and technology in the detection of nuclear explosions, which could no longer be concealed from the peoples, the United States was compelled to recognize the adequacy of national systems of detection as a basis for control over nuclear explosions.

At first the United States and the United Kingdom were compelled to recognize the adequacy of national systems for control over nuclear explosions in three environments: in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space. In one of their documents (ENDC/59) they stated that they were prepared to agree to the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in these three environments without any inspection, relying exclusively on national -- that is, their own -- means of control. But at the same time the Western Powers continued to hold out in regard to underground nuclear explosions. They insisted as before on the establishment of an international control system, including on-site inspection, in regard to the detection of underground nuclear explosions (ENDC/58, article VIII).

Some time later, however, the same circumstances which compelled the Western Powers -- the United States and the United Kingdom -- to agree that control over nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space should be carried

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out on the basis of national systems of control without any on-site inspection, compelled the United States to declare that it recognized the effectiveness of national systems of observation for the detection of underground nuclear explosions as well. The United States was compelled to reveal what had been concealed till recently from the people of the United States and from the world. It finally admitted (ENDC/82, p.24) that its national system for the detection of nuclear explosions was so effective and had achieved such "phenomenal" success that it no longer needed a system of international posts on the territory of the Soviet Union but could detect nuclear explosions in the territory of the Soviet Union with its own, that is national, means. Thus the United States finally recognized the effectiveness of national systems of detection in regard to underground nuclear explosions as well.

This effectiveness was dramatically revealed during a debate in the United States Senate on 7 March by Senator Humphrey, as well as in a statement by eminent United States scientists which appeared quite recently. I am referring to a statement by a group of United States scientists which was published in the Washington Post on 9 April 1963 (ENDC/85). That statement was of such great significance for the proper elucidation of the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests that on the same day, that is on the day of its publication, it was included in the official records of the United States Congress.

However, having admitted the effectiveness of national means of control in regard to underground nuclear explosions, the United States lapsed into an obvious inconsistency in its position, an inconsistency which has in fact led our negotiations on this question once again into an impasse. The point is that, having recognized the effectiveness of national systems of control in regard to underground nuclear explosions, the United States ought to have abandoned completely all claims in respect of on-site inspection. At the present time the demand for on-site inspection is untenable and unnecessary from the standpoint of control. This was in fact admitted by the United States scientists, who in the aforementioned letter of 9 April stated that they regarded on-site inspection only as an additional guarantee. But the official position of the United States in our negotiations here in Geneva has not undergone any essential or radical changes in regard to inspection. The present position of the United States is inconsistent and does not stand up to criticism.

Well, then, the situation at present is clear enough. The negotiations have again reached an impasse because of the position of the United States. The responsibility for this lies entirely with the United States. We believe that its British allies, who are devoting a good deal of intelligence, energy and resourcefulness to preventing

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

an agreement, as Mr. Godber is constantly doing, would hardly venture for long to resist and prevent an agreement if the United States were willing to come to terms.

To achieve an agreement it is essential that the United States should correct this organic defect in its position, which is that, having recognized the effectiveness of national detection systems for control over underground nuclear explosions, it has not drawn the appropriate conclusion in regard to inspection, as it should have done. The appropriate conclusion in regard to inspection is that the United States should renounce its demand for inspection also in regard to underground nuclear explosions, just as it has done in regard to nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. On the question of inspection the United States still takes the same position as it did before, namely, when it insisted on an international control system and denied the adequacy or even the possibility of exercising effective control over compliance with an agreement on the basis of national detection systems.

It is precisely on this point that the goodwill and desire of the Soviet Union to solve the question of inspection on the basis of a mutually-acceptable compromise is particularly evident. The Soviet Union considers that for control over an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests, including underground tests, no inspection is necessary or required. This position of the Soviet Union is meeting with ever new confirmation day after day in the achievements of science and technology.

However, despite these facts, the United States is stubbornly trying to secure inspection. In our negotiations the United States representatives have told us that it would be difficult for the United States to enter into an agreement which would not provide at all for inspection. They have told us that it would be difficult to pass such an agreement through Congress, that Congress would not approve it. As you see, our United States colleagues have put this question on a purely political plane. Yet at the same time they are evading a political solution of the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

The Soviet Union made a substantial political concession to the United States in this matter solely for the sake of achieving an agreement. This concession was that the Soviet Union would agree to two to three inspections a year for the verification of significant seismic events suspected of being nuclear explosions (ENDC/73, p.5). This concession of the Soviet Union was all the more important because it was made in the circumstances where the facts and data relating to the progress of science and technology still further corroborated the position of the Soviet Government that no inspection is required for control over an agreement on the cessation of nuclear

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

weapon tests. This view of the Soviet Government is being strengthened more and more every day and is meeting with ever new confirmation of its correctness and soundness.

We have already pointed out repeatedly in our statements that in these negotiations the United States has been carrying on a policy of "lost opportunities". It seems to us that the United States is not far removed from doing so even now. We now have a possibility of coming to an agreement. The conditions and basis for an agreement have already been determined. They have taken shape in the course of our lengthy negotiations. This basis for an agreement consists of the following propositions:

1. Control over an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear tests must be carried out on the basis of national detection systems.
2. As an additional guarantee, two to three inspections a year may be allowed.
3. Three atomic seismic stations should be set up on the territories of each of the nuclear Powers, in order to give the other side additional assurance regarding the accuracy of the functioning of national detection systems.

But the United States avoids reaching agreement on this basis. Such is the present situation with regard to the question of an agreement concerning the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. We are convinced that the time is not far off when the data confirming the effectiveness of national detection systems will be so convincing and incontrovertible that the question of inspection will no longer arise at all.

We believe, however, that it is not a question of inspection here and that it is not on account of inspection that we have no agreement. If the matter depended only on inspection, then, as a matter of fact, the United States has obtained from the Soviet Union what it wanted, what it asked us for, namely two to three inspections a year. But the whole trouble is that, as soon as the United States got from the Soviet Union what it had asked for, the appetite of the United States intelligence services was whetted and the United States, repudiating its own words, took a step backward in this matter and began to demand a larger number of inspections from us.

In connexion with this position of the United States, it is appropriate to recall the following passage from a statement made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, at a meeting of voters in Moscow on 27 February:

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

"The Governments of the Western Powers will in the end have to account in full to the peoples of the world for their policy aimed at disrupting the cause of disarmament and further intensifying the armaments race. The policy of the armaments race has long come into conflict with the interests not only of individual States but of all mankind. Even on such an essentially far from decisive question as the cessation of nuclear weapon tests we have been unable so far to come to an agreement with our partners. Some people would like an agreement on the cessation of tests to provide an opportunity for NATO to carry out intelligence activities in our country. Of course the Soviet Government will not agree to that. We have agreed to certain international measures for control over the cessation of tests, including two to three on-site inspections a year on the territory of each nuclear Power. That was a serious concession on our part, and no more should be expected from us."

It is also appropriate to quote the following passage from an interview given by Mr. Khrushchev to the director of the Italian paper Il Giorno, which was published in the Moscow newspapers on 24 April 1963:

"Therefore the question may arise now whether we should not revert, as the United States did, to our earlier positions and withdraw our agreement to the carrying out of two to three inspections a year, since we are firmly convinced that national detection systems are adequate for detecting any nuclear tests."

Consequently, as you see, if we have no agreement, it is not at all because of inspection. As we see it, the trouble is in the general trend of the policy of the United States. The reasons why we are in an impasse and there is no progress in our negotiations should be sought, not within the Committee nor in the question of inspection, but in the policy which is being carried on by the Western Powers outside the Committee. The point is in the armaments race, the feverish military preparations, the formation of an aggressive NATO nuclear force and the spreading of nuclear weapons to other NATO members (above all, to Western Germany), and so forth. We have no illusions in this regard; nevertheless we think that the United States, the United Kingdom and France should be no less interested than the Soviet Union in the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

The United States representatives tell us here that the conclusion of a nuclear weapon test ban treaty is an urgent necessity. Unfortunately, however, on the lips of the United States and United Kingdom representatives this statement sounds false, like a pious wish not backed by deeds. If the ruling circles of the Western Powers can find within themselves enough wisdom and foresight, enough firmness, determination and, above all, good will expressed in deeds rather than words, and come to an agreement really to cease all nuclear weapon tests, then an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests can be concluded very quickly. The basis for such an agreement already exists, and I have just given a brief account of it.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): Except in point of time, I do not propose to follow the statement which has just been made by our Soviet colleague. Quite frankly, I am not in the mood, as he evidently was, to make a controversial statement this morning; and if I were in such a mood I am not at all certain that the Committee would wish to indulge in controversy.

As we sit here this morning we are faced with two major facts. The first, which was referred to in his eloquent speech by our colleague from Nigeria (supra, p.5) is that although we seem to be in sight, and perhaps even within hailing distance, of being able to reach agreement on a treaty for the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, the steps which still lie before us appear to be, I hope not impossible, but extremely difficult to take.

The second major fact is that, as the Committee knows and as our United States colleague has reminded us this morning (supra, p. 18), the heads of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States made a direct approach last week to the head of the Soviet Government to try to break the deadlock in the negotiations for a nuclear test ban treaty. We must all hope --- perhaps it would be fair to say that we should all pray --- that the result of that initiative will give us new hope in our task here and new reality to the discussions in which we have been engaged so far.

In the meantime it is impossible, I think, to contribute in any original way to our discussion. I merely wish this morning to make three points which are not new but which I consider so important that I trust that my colleagues will forgive me for making them once again.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

The first point is that a nuclear test ban treaty is of high importance not only to this Conference but to the whole world. We must not give up our efforts here in search of a treaty, however much we have to repeat ourselves and however often we feel ourselves frustrated or disappointed. Naturally, a nuclear test ban treaty is of high importance for moral and humanitarian reasons, but it is important also for many other reasons. It is important because the signing of a nuclear test ban treaty would have tremendous value in creating confidence between West and East in the major ideological conflict in the world today; it is important because, once concluded, a nuclear test ban treaty would provide experience of an entirely new kind, given the situation in the world today, in operating an international agreement; and it is important because we may hope that that confidence and that experience would lead us on to other agreements in the field of disarmament, and ultimately to general and complete disarmament itself.

The second main point I wish to reiterate is that the West -- and of course I speak above all for the United Kingdom -- wants a nuclear test ban treaty, and wants it soon. I think that no reasonable man judging the actions and the statements of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States could continue to have any serious doubts on that score.

What have we said? We have said that we will adopt any reasonable method of procedure suggested to us that gives hope of progress, even if the progress promised looks small. We offer to discuss in detail the information on which our present proposals are based. We offer to discuss any other information that may be produced. We are ready to reconsider our position if such discussion should show that to be justifiable. We will discuss a test ban treaty in any reasonable forum. We will do any of those things. The only thing we cannot and will not do is take a leap in the dark. That is precisely what our Soviet colleague is at the moment asking us to do; it is in fact what he has invited us again this morning to do.

That brings me to my third and last point. Our immediate goal is real negotiation and a free exchange of views on all the problems before us bearing on a nuclear test ban treaty. As the Indian representative, Mr. Lall, said to us in another context:

"... we should hope that, in a certain spirit of give and take, it would be possible for delegations, even when they do not themselves regard a particular issue as of great significance, to deal with it if other delegations do regard it as an issue of importance." (ENDC/PV.121, p.28)

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

It is in that spirit that I wish to appeal once more to our Soviet colleague. We ask him to take account of the points which, we have explained to him, are important for us. We ask him at least to let us have some preliminary thoughts on them, whether or not those thoughts agree with our own.

Let me say that we not only welcome thoughts and ideas from the Soviet Union; we welcome thoughts and ideas from all other members of the Committee. On 25 February I myself said (ENDC/PV.102, pp.12,13) that I felt sure the spokesmen of each of the non-aligned countries would have many contributions to make, and that it would be natural that they should be eager to make them. I asked whether it was right that such contributions should be put into the deep freeze, so to speak, until the question of numbers had been settled. We think there is no profit to be gained by putting any of our problems into the deep freeze. All the problems before us must be settled at some time, and it is hard to see what harm there could be in discussing them here and now.

Our Soviet colleague has told us on more than one occasion that the Soviet Union has contributions to make on the very problems which we wish to discuss in the context of a system of on-site inspections. He may not think that those problems are important, but we do. If the Soviet Government has ideas upon them, and if the Soviet Government wants a nuclear test ban treaty, surely it is not too much to ask that our Soviet colleagues should do the Committee the service of putting their ideas before us.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)(translation from Russian): I wish to avail myself of the right of reply in order to give a brief answer to the United Kingdom representative. He has just said that the only thing not to be expected of the Western Powers is that they should take a leap in the dark (supra, p. 31). All right. But what does he call "the dark"? The Soviet Union's proposal, which we consider can be taken as a basis for an agreement. We have explained the three points which have crystallized during our negotiations and which can be taken as a basis for an agreement. The basis is that control must be carried out by the existing national systems, then two to three inspections a year and three automatic seismic stations on the territory of each of the nuclear Powers, for verification of the functioning of the national systems.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Sir Paul Mason has told us that for the Western Powers to agree on such a basis would be tantamount to "taking a leap in the dark". What is the alternative to this "dark"? It is to continue to have no agreement, to continue the arms race, to continue nuclear weapon tests, and to arrive at the situation which President Kennedy spoke about recently, in which there will be ten, fifteen and perhaps even twenty-five nuclear Powers, in which it will be altogether impossible to reach any agreement whatsoever on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, and in which the threat of a nuclear missile war will be inevitable for mankind.

That is the alternative. That alternative, as I understood Sir Paul Mason, would not be a "leap in the dark" for the Western Powers, whereas the Soviet Union's proposal to reach agreement on the basis of the three points proposed by us would be a "leap in the dark" for them. It is an astonishing admission by a representative of the Western Powers, which emphasizes once again the role which the United Kingdom is playing in our negotiations and how it looks at matters.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and twenty-sixth plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Mehta, representative of India.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Nigeria, Bulgaria, the United States of America, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 3 May 1963, at 11 a.m. "

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.

